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Abstract
We present a black-box adversarial attack algo-
rithm which sets new state-of-the-art model eva-
sion rates for query efficiency in the `∞ and
`2 metrics, where only loss-oracle access to the
model is available. On two public black-box at-
tack challenges, the algorithm achieves the high-
est evasion rate, surpassing all of the submitted
attacks. Similar performance is observed on a
model that is secure against substitute-model at-
tacks. For standard models trained on the MNIST,
CIFAR10, and IMAGENET datasets, averaged
over the datasets and metrics, the algorithm is
3.8× less failure-prone, and spends in total 2.5×
fewer queries than the current state-of-the-art at-
tacks combined given a budget of 10, 000 queries
per attack attempt. Notably, it requires no hy-
perparameter tuning or any data/time-dependent
prior. The algorithm exploits a new approach,
namely sign-based rather than magnitude-based
gradient estimation. This shifts the estimation
from continuous to binary black-box optimization.
With three properties of the directional derivative,
we examine three approaches to adversarial at-
tacks. This yields a superior algorithm breaking a
standard MNIST model using just 12 queries on
average!
1. Introduction
Problem. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to
adversarial examples, which are malicious inputs designed
to fool the network’s prediction—see (Biggio & Roli, 2018)
for a comprehensive, recent overview of adversarial exam-
ples. Research on generating these malicious inputs started
in the white-box setting, where access to the gradients of
the models was assumed. Since the gradient points to the
direction of steepest ascent, a malicious input can be per-
turbed along that gradient to maximize the network’s loss,
1CSAIL, MIT, USA. Correspondence to: Abdullah
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thereby fooling its prediction. The assumption of access
to the underlying gradient does not however reflect real
world scenarios. Attacks accepting a more realistic, restric-
tive black-box threat model, which do not assume access to
gradients, have since been studied as will be summarized
shortly.
Central to the approach of generating adversarial examples
in a black-box threat model is estimating the gradients of
the model being attacked. In estimating these gradients
(their magnitudes and signs), the community at large has
focused on formulating it as a problem in continuous opti-
mization. Their works seek to reduce the query complexity
from the standard O(n), where n is the number of input
features/covariates. In this paper, we take a different view
and focus on estimating just the sign of the gradient by refor-
mulating the problem as minimizing the Hamming distance
to the gradient sign. Given access to a Hamming distance
(to the gradient sign) oracle, this view guarantees a query
complexity of Ω(n/log2(n + 1)): an order of magnitude
lesser than the full gradient estimation’s query complexity
for most practically-occurring input dimensions n. Our key
objective is to answer the following: Is it possible to re-
cover the sign of the gradient with high query efficiency
and generate adversarial examples as effective as those
generated by full gradient estimation approaches?
To this end, we propose a novel formulation capitalizing
on some properties of the directional derivative which, ap-
proximated by finite difference of loss queries, has been the
powerhouse of black-box attacks. Particularly, this leads
to the following contributions at the intersection of adver-
sarial machine learning and black-box (zeroth-order) opti-
mization: 1) We present three properties of the directional
derivative of the loss function of the model under attack
in the direction of {±1}n vectors, and propose methods
to estimate the gradient sign bits exploiting these proper-
ties. Based on one of the properties, namely separability,
we devise a divide-and-conquer algorithm, which we refer
to as SignHunter, that reduces the search complexity
from 2n sign vectors to O(n). When given a budget of
O(n) queries, SignHunter is guaranteed to perform at
least as well as FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015), which has
access to the model’s gradient. Through rigorous experi-
ments on both standard and adversarially trained models, we
find that SignHunter, in its search for the gradient sign,
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crafts adversarial examples within a fraction of this number
of queries outperforming FGSM and other state-of-the-art
black-box attacks.1 2) We release a software framework to
systematically benchmark adversarial black-box attacks on
DNNs for MNIST, CIFAR10, and IMAGENET datasets in
terms of their success rate, query count, and other related
metrics. 3) We identify several key areas of research which
we believe will help the community of adversarial learning
and gradient-free optimization.
Related Work. We organize the related work in two themes,
namely Adversarial Example Generation and Sign-Based
Optimization.
Adversarial Example Generation. This literature can be
organized as generating examples in either a white-box or a
black-box setting. Nelson et al. (2012) provide a theoretical
framework to analyze adversarial querying in a white-box
setting. Following the works of Biggio et al. (2013) and
Goodfellow et al. (2015) who introduced the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM), several methods to produce adversar-
ial examples have been proposed for various learning tasks
and threat perturbation constraints (Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Hayes & Danezis, 2017; Al-
Dujaili et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2018; Kurakin et al., 2017;
Shamir et al., 2019). These methods assume a white-box
setup and are not the focus of this work. An approach, which
has received the community’s attention, involves learning
adversarial examples for one model (with access to its gra-
dient information) to transfer them against another (Liu
et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2017). As an alternative to
the transferability phenomenon, Xiao et al. (2018) use a
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) to generate adver-
sarial examples which are based on small norm-bounded
perturbations. Both approaches involve learning on a differ-
ent model, which is expensive, and does not lend itself to
comparison in our setup, where we directly query the model
of interest. Among works which generate examples in a
black-box setting through iterative optimization schemes,
Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan (2017) showed how a naïve
policy of perturbing random segments of an image achieved
adversarial example generation. They do not use any gradi-
ent information. Bhagoji et al. (2017) reduce the dimensions
of the feature space using Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) and random feature grouping, before estimating gra-
dients. This enables them to bound the number of queries
made. Chen et al. (2017) introduced a principled approach
to solving this problem using gradient based optimization.
They employ finite differences, a zeroth-order optimization
tool, to estimate the gradient and then use it to design a
gradient-based attack on models. While this approach suc-
cessfully generates adversarial examples, it is expensive in
1The code for reproducing our work will be made available at
https://github.com/ALFA-group
the number of queries made to the model. Ilyas et al. (2018)
substitute traditional finite differences methods with Natural
Evolutionary Strategies (NES) to obtain an estimate of the
gradient. Tu et al. (2018) provide an adaptive random gra-
dient estimation algorithm that balances query counts and
distortion, and introduces a trained auto-encoder to achieve
attack acceleration. (Ilyas et al., 2019) extend this line of
work by proposing the idea of gradient priors and bandits:
BanditsTD. Our work contrasts the general approach
used by these works. We investigate whether just estimat-
ing the sign of the gradient suffices to efficiently generate
examples.
Sign-Based Optimization. In the context of general-purpose
continuous optimization methods, sign-based stochastic gra-
dient descent was studied in both zeroth- and first-order
setups. In the latter, Bernstein et al. (2018) analyzed
signSGD, a sign-based Stochastic Gradient Descent, and
showed that it enjoys a faster empirical convergence than
SGD in addition to the cost reduction of communicating gra-
dients across multiple workers. Liu et al. (2019) extended
signSGD to zeroth-order setup with the ZO-SignSGD al-
gorithm. ZO-SignSGD requires
√
n times more iterations
than signSGD, leading to a convergence rate ofO(
√
n/T ),
where n is the number of optimization variables, and T is
the number of iterations.
Adversarial Examples Meet Sign-based Optimization. In
the context of adversarial examples generation, the effec-
tiveness of sign of the gradient coordinates was noted in
both white- and black-box settings. In the former, the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)—which is algorithmically
similar to signSGD—was proposed to generate white-box
adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Ilyas et al.
(2019) examined a noisy version of FGSM to address the
question of How accurate of a gradient estimate is nec-
essary to execute a successful attack on a neural net. In
Figure 1, we reproduce their experiment on an IMAGENET-
based model—Plot (c)—and extended it to the MNIST and
CIFAR10 datasets—Plots (a) and (b). Observe that estimat-
ing the sign of the top 30% gradient coordinates (in terms of
their magnitudes) is enough to achieve a misclassification
rate of ∼ 70%. Furthermore, ZO-SignSGD (Liu et al.,
2019) was shown to perform better than NES at generating
adversarial examples against a black-box neural network on
the MNIST dataset.
2. Formal Background
Notation. Let n denote the dimension of a neural network’s
input. Denote a hidden n-dimensional binary code by q∗.
That is, q∗ ∈ H ≡ {−1,+1}n. The response of the
Hamming (distance) oracle O to the ith query q(i) ∈ H
is denoted by r(i) ∈ {0, . . . , n} and equals the Hamming
distance r(i) = ||q(i) − q∗||H , where the Hamming norm
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Figure 1: Misclassification rate of three neural nets (for (a) MNIST, (b) CIFAR10, and (c) IMAGENET) on the noisy
FGSM’s adversarial examples as a function of correctly estimated coordinates of sign(∇xf(x, y)) on random 1000 images
from the corresponding datasets. Across all the models, estimating the sign of the top 30% gradient coordinates (in terms of
their magnitudes) is enough to achieve a misclassification rate of ∼ 70%. More details can be found in Appendix A.
||v||H is defined as the number of non-zero entries of vector
v. We also refer to O as the noiseless Hamming oracle,
in contrast to the noisy Hamming oracle Oˆ, which returns
noisy versions of O’s responses. 1n is the n-dimensional
vector of ones. The query ratio ρ ∈ (0, 1] is defined as m/n
where m is the number of queries to O required to retrieve
q∗. Furthermore, denote the directional derivative of some
function f at a point x in the direction of a vector v by
Dvf(x) ≡ vT∇xf(x) which often can be approximated
by the finite difference method. That is, for δ > 0, we have
Dvf(x) = v
T∇xf(x) ≈ f(x + δv)− f(x)
δ
. (1)
Let ΠS(·) be the projection operator onto the set S,Bp(x, )
be the `p ball of radius  around x. Next, we provide lower
and upper bounds on the query ratio ρ.
Bounds on the Query Ratio ρ. Using a packing argument,
Vaishampayan (2012) proved the following lower bound on
query ratio ρ.
Theorem 1. (Vaishampayan, 2012, Theorem 1) For the
noiseless Hamming oracle O, the query ratio must satisfy
ρ = m/n ≥ 1log2(n+1) for any sequence of m queries that
determine every n-dimensional binary code q∗ uniquely.
Proof. See (Vaishampayan, 2012, Page 4).
In the following theorem, we show that no more than n
queries are required to retrieve the hidden n-dimensional
binary code q∗.
Theorem 2. A hidden n-dimensional binary code q∗ ∈ H
can be retrieved exactly with no more than n queries to the
noiseless Hamming oracle O.
Proof. See Appendix C.
3. Gradient Estimation Problem
At the heart of black-box adversarial attacks is generating a
perturbation vector to slightly modify the original input x
so as to fool the network prediction of its true label y. Put
differently, an adversarial example x′ maximizes the net-
work’s loss L(x′, y) but still remains p-close to the original
input x. Although the loss function L can be non-concave,
gradient-based techniques are often very successful in craft-
ing an adversarial example (Madry et al., 2017). That is,
setting the perturbation vector as a step in the direction of
∇xL(x, y). Consequently, the bulk of black-box attack
methods try to estimate the gradient by querying an oracle
that returns, for a given input/label pair (x, y), the value of
the network’s loss L(x, y). Using only such value queries,
the basic approach relies on the finite difference method to
approximate the directional derivative (Eq. 1) of the function
L at the input/label pair (x, y) in the direction of a vector
v, which corresponds to vT∇xL(x, y). With n linearly
independent vectors {v(i)T∇xL(x, y) = d(i)}1≤i≤n, one
can construct a linear system of equations to recover the
full gradient. Clearly, this approach’s query complexity is
O(n), which can be prohibitively expensive for large n (e.g.,
n = 268, 203 for the IMAGENET dataset). Moreover, the
queries are not adaptive, whereas one could make use of
the past queries’ responses to construct the new query and
recover the full gradient with less queries. Recent works
tried to mitigate this issue by exploiting data- and/or time-
dependent priors (Tu et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2018; 2019).
The lower bound of Theorem 1 on the query complexity
of a Hamming oracle O to find a hidden vector q∗ sug-
gests the following: instead of estimating the full gradient
(sign and magnitude) and apart from exploiting any data-
or time-dependent priors; focus on estimating its sign After
all, simply leveraging (noisy) sign information of the gradi-
ent yields successful attacks; see Figure 1. Therefore, our
interest in this paper is the gradient sign estimation problem,
which we formally define next, breaking away from the
full gradient estimation to construct black-box adversarial
attacks.
Definition 1. (Gradient Sign Estimation Problem) For an
input/label pair (x, y) and a loss function L, let g∗ =
∇xL(x, y) be the gradient of L at (x, y) and q∗ =
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sign(g∗) ∈ H be the sign bit vector of g∗.2 Then the goal
of the gradient sign estimation problem is to find a binary
vector q ∈ H minimizing the Hamming norm
min
q∈H
||q − q∗||H , (2)
or equivalently maximizing the directional derivative3
max
q∈H
DqL(x, y) , (3)
from a limited number of (possibly adaptive) function value
queries L(x′, y).
Next, we tackle the gradient sign estimation problem lever-
aging three properties of the loss directional derivative
DqL(x, y) which, in the black-box setup, is approximated
by finite difference of loss value queries L(x′, y).
4. A Framework for Estimating Sign of the
Gradient from Loss Oracles
Our goal is to estimate the gradient sign bits of the loss
function L of the model under attack at an input/label pair
(x, y) from a limited number of loss value queries L(x′, y).
To this end, we examine the basic concept of directional
derivatives that has been employed in recent black-box ad-
versarial attacks. Particularly, we present three approaches
to estimate the gradient sign bits based on three properties
of the directional derivative DqL(x, y) of the loss in the
direction of a sign vector q ∈ H. For the rest of the paper,
we only discuss the most successful one: Divide & Conquer.
Others are described in Appendix B.
Approach 1: Divide & Conquer. Based on the definition
of the directional derivative (Eq. 1), we state the following
property.
Property 1 (Separability of DqL(x, y)). The directional
derivativeDqL(x, y) of the loss functionL at an input/label
pair (x, y) in the direction of a binary code q is separable.
That is,
max
q∈H
DqL(x, y) = max
q∈H
qTg∗ =
n∑
i=1
max
qi∈{−1,+1}
qig
∗
i (4)
We employ the above property in a divide-and-conquer
search which we refer to as SignHunter. As outlined
2Without loss of generality, we encode the sign bit vector in
H ≡ {−1,+1}n rather than {0, 1}n. This is a common represen-
tation in sign-related literature. Note that the standard sign func-
tion has the range of {−1, 0,+1}. Here, we use the non-standard
definition (Zhao, 2018) whose range is {−1,+1}. This follows
from the observation that DNNs’ gradients are not sparse (Ilyas
et al., 2019, Appendix B.1).
3The equivalence follows from DqL(x, y) = qTg∗, which
is maximized when q = q∗ = sign(g∗), which in turn is a
minimizer of Eq. 2.
in Algorithm 1, the technique starts with a random guess of
the sign vector q1. It then proceeds to flip the sign of all the
coordinates to get a new sign vector q2, and revert the flips
if the loss oracle returned a value L(x + δq2, y) (or equiva-
lently the directional derivative ) less than the best obtained
so far L(x + δq1, y). SignHunter applies the same rule
to the first half of the coordinates, the second half, the first
quadrant, the second quadrant, and so on. For a search space
of dimension n, SignHunter needs 2dlog(n)+1e − 1 sign
flips to complete its search. If the query budget is not ex-
hausted by then, one can update x with the recovered signs
and restart the procedure at the updated point with a new
starting code q1 (s in Algorithm 1). In the next theorem, we
show that SignHunter is guaranteed to perform at least
as well as the Fast Gradient Sign Method FGSM with O(n)
oracle queries.
Theorem 3. (Optimality of SignHunter) Given
2dlog(n)+1e queries and that the directional derivative
is well approximated by the finite-difference (Eq. 1),
SignHunter is at least as effective as FGSM (Goodfellow
et al., 2015) in crafting adversarial examples.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Theorem 3 provides an upper bound on the number of
queries required for SignHunter to recover the gradi-
ent sign bits, and perform as well as FGSM. In practice (as
will be shown in our experiments), SignHunter crafts
adversarial examples with a fraction of this upper bound.
Note that one could recover the gradient sign vector with
n + 1 < 2dlog(n)+1e queries by starting with an arbitrary
sign vector and flipping its bits sequentially. Nevertheless,
SignHunter incorporates its queries in a framework of
majority voting (weighted by the magnitude of the gradient
coordinates) to recover as many sign bits as possible with
as few queries as possible. Consider the case where all the
gradient coordinates have the same magnitude. If we start
with a random sign vector whose Hamming distance to the
optimal sign vector q∗ is n/2: agreeing with q∗ in the first
half of coordinates. In this case, SignHunter needs just
three queries to recover the entire sign vector, whereas the
sequential bit flipping would require n+ 1 queries. While
the magnitudes of gradient coordinates may not have the
same value as considered in the previous example; through
empirical evaluation (see Appendix G), we found them to
be concentrated. Consequently and with high probability,
their votes on retaining or reverting sign flips are weighted
similarly.
Further, SignHunter is amenable to parallel hardware
architecture and thus can carry out attacks in batches more
efficiently, compared to the other two approaches we consid-
ered. We tested all the proposed approaches (SignHunter
and those in Appendix B) on a set of toy problems and found
that SignHunter perform significantly better. For these
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Algorithm 1 SignHunter
Input:
g : H → R : the black-box function to be maximized over
the binary hypercubeH ≡ {−1,+1}n
def init(g) :
i← 0
h← 0
g ← g
s ∼ U(H) // e.g., all ones [+1,+1, . . . ,+1]
done← false
gbest ← −∞
def is_done() :
return done
def step() :
chunk_len← dn/2he
flip the bits of s indexed from i∗chunk_len till
(i+ 1)∗chunk_len
if g(s) ≥ gbest:
gbest ← g(s)
else:
flip back the bits of s indexed from
i∗chunk_len till (i+ 1)∗chunk_len
increment i
if i == 2h:
i← 0
increment h
if h == dlog2(n)e+ 1: done← true
def get_current_sign_estimate() :
return s
reasons, in our experiments on the real datasets MNIST,
CIFAR10, IMAGENET; we opted for SignHunter as our
algorithm of choice to estimate the gradient sign in crafting
black-box adversarial attacks as outlined in Algorithm 2.
5. Experiments
We evaluate SignHunter and compare it with established
algorithms from the literature: ZO-SignSGD (Liu et al.,
2019), NES (Ilyas et al., 2018), and BanditsTD (Ilyas
et al., 2019) in terms of their effectiveness in crafting (with-
out loss of generality) untargeted black-box adversarial ex-
amples. Both `∞ and `2 threat models are considered on
the MNIST, CIFAR10, and IMAGENET datasets.
Experiments Setup. Our experiment setup is similar to
(Ilyas et al., 2019). Each attacker is given a budget of
10, 000 oracle queries per attack attempt and is evaluated on
1000 images from the test sets of MNIST, CIFAR10, and
the validation set of IMAGENET. We did not find a standard
practice of setting the perturbation bound , arbitrary bounds
were used in several papers.
We set the perturbation bounds based on the following. For
the `∞ threat model, we use (Madry et al., 2017)’s bound for
Algorithm 2 Black-Box Adversarial Example Generation
with SignHunter
Input:
xinit : input to be perturbed,
yinit : xinit’s true label,
Bp(., ) : `p perturbation ball of radius 
L : loss function of the neural net under attack
1: δ ←  // set finite-difference probe to perturbation bound
2: xo ← xinit
3: Define the function g as
g(q) =
L(ΠBp(xinit,)(xo + δq), yinit)− L(xo, yinit)
δ
4: SignHunter.init(g)
5: //C(·) returns top class
6: while C(x) = yinit do
7: SignHunter.step()
8: s← SignHunter.get_current_sign_estimate()
9: x← ΠBp(xinit,)(xo + δs)
10: if SignHunter.is_done() then
11: xo ← x
12: Define the function g as
g(q) =
L(ΠBp(xinit,)(xo + δq), yinit)− L(xo, yinit)
δ
13: SignHunter.init(g)
14: end if
15: end while
16: return x
MNIST and (Ilyas et al., 2019)’s bounds for both CIFAR10
and IMAGENET.
For the `2 threat model, (Ilyas et al., 2019)’s bound is used
for IMAGENET. MNIST’s bound is set based on the suffi-
cient distortions observed in (Liu et al., 2019), which are
smaller than the one used in (Madry et al., 2017). We use
the observed bound in (Cohen et al., 2019) for CIFAR10.
We show results based on standard models–i.e., models
that are not adversarially hardened. For MNIST and CI-
FAR10, the naturally trained models from (Madry et al.,
2017)’s MNIST4 and CIFAR105 challenges are used. For
IMAGENET, the Inception-V3 model from TensorFlow is
used.6 The loss oracle represents the cross-entropy loss of
the respective model. General setup of the experiments is
summarized in Appendix D.
Hyperparameters Setup. To ensure a fair comparison
among the considered algorithms, we did our best in tuning
their hyperparameters. Initially, the hyperparameters were
set to the values reported by the corresponding authors, for
which we observed suboptimal performance. This can be
4
https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
5
https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge
6
https://bit.ly/2VYDc4X
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attributed to either using a different software framework,
models, or the way the model’s inputs are transformed. We
made use of a synthetic concave loss function to tune the
algorithms for each dataset × perturbation constraint com-
bination. The performance curves on the synthetic loss
function using the tuned values of the hyperparameters did
show consistency with the reported results from the litera-
ture. For instance, we noted that ZO-SignSGD converges
faster than NES. Further, BanditsTD outperformed the
rest of the algorithms towards the end of query budget. That
said, we invite the community to provide their best tuned
attacks. Note that SignHunter does not have any hy-
perparameters to tune. The finite difference probe δ for
SignHunter is set to the perturbation bound  because
this perturbation is used for for both computing the finite
difference and crafting the adversarial examples—see Line 1
in Algorithm 2. This parameter-free setup of SignHunter
offers a robust edge over the state-of-the-art black-box at-
tacks, which often require expert knowledge to carefully
tune their parameters as discussed above. More details on
the hyperparameters setup can be found in Appendix D.
Results. Figure 2 shows the trade-off between the success
(evasion) rate and the mean number of queries (of the suc-
cessful attacks) needed to generate an adversarial example
for the MNIST, CIFAR10, and IMAGENET classifiers in
the `∞ and `2 perturbation constraints. In other words, these
figures indicate the average number of queries required for
a desired success rate. Tabulated summary of these plots
can be found in Appendix E, namely Tables 6, 7, and 8.
Furthermore, we plot the classifier loss and the gradient
estimation quality (in terms of Hamming distance and Co-
sine similarity) averaged over all the images as a function
of the number of queries used in Figures 10, 11, and 12 of
Appendix E. Based on the results, we observe the following:
For any given success rate, SignHunter dominates the
previous state of the art approaches in all settings except the
IMAGENET `2 setup,7 where BanditsTD shows a better
query efficiency when the desired success rate is greater
than or equal ∼ 0.35. Our approach is remarkably efficient
in the `∞ setup (e.g., achieving a 100% evasion using—
on average—just 12 queries per image against the MNIST
classifier!). Its performance degrades—yet, still outper-
forms the rest, most of the time—in the `2 setup. This is
expected, since SignHunter perturbs all the coordinates
with the same magnitude and the `2 perturbation bound
2 for all the datasets in our experiments is set such that
2/
√
n  ∞ as shown in Table 1 of Appendix D. Take
the case of MNIST (n = 28 × 28), where ∞ = 0.3 and
2 = 3. For SignHunter, the `2 setup is equivalent to an
`∞ perturbation bound of 3/28 ≈ 0.1. The employed `2
7Strictly speaking, all the algorithms are comparable in the
CIFAR10 `2 setup for success rate ≤ 0.3.
perturbation bounds give the state of the art—continuous
optimization based—approaches more perturbation options.
For instance, it is possible for NES to perturb just one pixel
in an MNIST image by a magnitude of 3; two pixels by a
magnitude of 2.1 each; ten pixels by a magnitude of 0.9
each, etc. On the other hand, the binary optimization view
of SignHunter limits it to always perturb all 28 × 28
pixels by a magnitude of 0.1. Despite its less degrees of
freedom, SignHunter maintains its effectiveness in the
`2 setup. The plots can be viewed as a sensitivity assessment
of SignHunter as  gets smaller for each dataset. More-
over, the performance of SignHunter is in line with The-
orem 3 when compared with the performance of FGSM (the
noisy FGSM at k = 100% in Figures 1 and 2 of Appendix
A) in both `∞ and `2 setups for MNIST and CIFAR10—
for IMAGENET, 2n = 536, 406 is beyond our query bud-
get of 10, 000 queries. For example, FGSM has a failure
rate of 0.32 for CIFAR10 `2 (Appendix A, Figure 2 (b)),
while SignHunter achieves a failure rate of 0.21 with
692.39 < 2n = 2 × 3 × 32 × 32 = 6144 queries (Ap-
pendix E, Table 7).
Incorporating SignHunter in an iterative framework of
perturbing the data point x till the query budget is exhausted
(Lines 10 to 14 in Algorithm 2) supports the observation
in white-box settings that iterative FGSM—or Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD)—is stronger than FGSM (Madry
et al., 2017; Al-Dujaili et al., 2018). This is evident by
the upticks in SignHunter’s performance on the MNIST
`2 case (Figure 10 of Appendix E: classifier’s loss, Cosine
and Hamming similarity plots), which happens after every
iteration (after every other 2 × 28 × 28 queries). Plots of
the Hamming similarity capture the quality of the gradi-
ent sign estimation in terms of Eq. 2, while plots of the
average Cosine similarity capture it in terms of Eq. 12.
Both SignHunter and BanditsTD consistently opti-
mize both objectives. In general, SignHunter enjoys a
faster convergence especially on the Hamming metric as
it is estimating the signs compared to BanditsTD’s full
gradient estimation. This is highlighted in the IMAGENET
`2 setup. Note that once an attack is successful, the gradient
sign estimation at that point is used for the rest of the plot.
This explains why, in the `∞ settings, SignHunter’s plot
does not improve compared to its `2 counterpart, as most of
the attacks are successful in the very first few queries made
to the loss oracle.
Overall, SignHunter is 3.8× less failure-prone than the
state-of-the-art approaches combined, and spends over all
the images (successful and unsuccessful attacks) 2.5× less
queries. The number of queries spent is computed based on
Tables 6, 7, and 8 of Appendix E as
(1 - fail_rate) * avg_#_queries + fail_rate * 10,000.
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Figure 2: Performance of black-box attacks in the `∞ and `2 perturbation constraint. The plots show the average number of
queries used per successful image for each attack when reaching a specified success rate.
Table 1: Top-3 attacks on the MNIST black-box challenge.
Adapted from the challenge’s website—as of Feb 22, 2019.
Black-Box Attack Model Accuracy
SignHunter (Algorithm 2) 91.47%
(Xiao et al., 2018) 92.76%
PGD against three independently and adversarially trained copies of the network 93.54%
6. Attack Effectiveness Under Defenses
Table 2: Top-3 attacks for the CIFAR10 black-box challenge.
Adapted from the challenge’s website—as of Feb 22, 2019.
Black-Box Attack Model Accuracy
SignHunter (Algorithm 2) 47.16%
PGD on the cross-entropy loss for the adversarially trained public network 63.39%
PGD on the CW loss for the adversarially trained public network 64.38%
Table 3: Top 1 Error percentage. The numbers between
brackets are computed on 10,000 images from the validation
set. The rest are from (Tramèr et al., 2017, Table 4).
Model clean Max. Black-box SignHunterafter 20 queries after 1000 queries
v3adv-ens4 24.2 (26.73) 33.4 (40.61) (90.75)
To complement our results in Section 5, we evaluated
SignHunter against adversarial training, an effective
way to improve the robustness of DNNs (Madry et al., 2017).
In particular, we attacked the secret models used in public
challenges for MNIST and CIFAR10. There was no corre-
sponding challenge for IMAGENET. Instead, we used en-
semble adversarial training, a method that argues security
against black-box attacks based on transferability/substitute
models (Tramèr et al., 2017). The same metrics used in Sec-
tion 5 are recorded for the experiments here in Appendix F.
Public MNIST Black-Box Attack Challenge. In line with
the challenge setup, 10, 000 test images were used with an
`∞ perturbation bound of  = 0.3. Although the secret
model is released, we treated it as a black box similar to
our experiments in Section 5. No maximum query budget
was specified, so we set it to 5, 000 queries. This is sim-
ilar to the number of iterations given to a PGD attack in
the white-box setup of the challenge: 100-steps with 50
random restarts. As shown in Table 1, SignHunter’s
attacks resulted in the lowest model accuracy of 91.47%,
outperforming all other state-of-the-art black-box attack
strategies submitted to the challenge with an average num-
ber of queries of 233 per successful attack. We would
like to note that the attacks submitted to the challenge are
based on transferability and do not query the model of inter-
est. On the other hand, the most powerful white-box attack
by Zheng et al. (2018)—as of Feb 22, 2019—resulted in
a model accuracy of 88.56%–not shown in the table. Fur-
ther, a PGD attack with 5000 iterations/back-propagations
(100 steps and 50 random restarts) achieves 89.71% in con-
trast to SignHunter’s 91.47% with just 5000 forward-
propagations.
Public CIFAR10 Black-Box Attack Challenge. In line
with the challenge setup, 10, 000 test images were used
with an `∞ perturbation bound of  = 8. Although the
secret model is released, we treated it as a black box simi-
lar to our experiments in Section 5. Similar to the MNIST
challenge, the query budget is 5, 000 queries. From Ta-
ble 2, SignHunter’s attacks resulted in the lowest model
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accuracy of 47.16%, outperforming all other state-of-the-
art black-box attack strategies submitted to the challenge
with an average number of queries of 569 per successful
attack. We would like to note that the attacks submitted to
the challenge are based on transferability and do not query
the model of interest. On the other hand, the most powerful
white-box attack by Zheng et al. (2018), —as of Feb 22,
2019—resulted in a model accuracy of 44.71%–not shown
in the table. Further, a PGD attack with 200 iterations/back-
propagations (20 steps and 10 restarts) achieves 45.71%
in contrast to SignHunter’s 47.16% with 5000 forward-
propagations.
Ensemble Adversarial Training on IMAGENET. In line
with (Tramèr et al., 2017), we set  = 0.0625 and re-
port the model’s misclassification over 10,000 random im-
ages from IMAGENET’s validation set. We attack the
v3adv-ens4 model.8 As shown in Table 3, after 20 queries,
SignHunter achieves a top-1 error of 40.61% greater
than the 33.4% rate of a series of black-box attacks (in-
cluding PGD with 20 iterations) transferred from a substi-
tute model. With 1000 queries, SignHunter breaks the
model’s robustness with a top-1 error of 90.75%!
7. Open Questions
There are many interesting questions left open by our re-
search:
Priors. Current version of SignHunter does not exploit
any data- or time-dependent priors. With these priors, al-
gorithms such as BanditsTD operate on a search space
of dimensionality ∼ 36× less than that of SignHunter
for IMAGENET. In domain-specific examples such as im-
ages, can Binary Partition Trees (BPT) (Al-Dujaili et al.,
2015) be incorporated in SignHunter to have a data-
dependent grouping of gradient coordinates instead of the
current equal-size grouping?
Adversarial Training. Compared to other attacks that are
based on transferability and generative adversarial networks,
our approach showed more effectiveness towards (ensemble)
adversarial training. Standard adversarial training relies
on attacks that employ iterative continuous optimization
methods such as PGD in contrast to our attack which stems
from a binary optimization view. What are the implications?
Other Domains. Much of the work done to understand
and counter adversarail examples has occurred in the image
classification domain. The binary view of our approach
lends itself naturally to other domains where binary features
are used (e.g., malware detection (Al-Dujaili et al., 2018;
Demetrio et al., 2019)). How effective our approach is on
these domains?
8
https://bit.ly/2XWTdKx
Perturbation Vertices.9 Using its first O(n) queries,
SignHunter probes O(n) extreme points of the perturba-
tion region as potential adversarial examples, while iterative
continuous optimization such as NES probes points in the
Gaussian sphere around the current point as shown in Fig-
ure 3. Does looking up extreme points (vertices) of the
perturbation region suffice to craft adversarial examples?
If that is the case, how to efficiently search through them?
SignHunter searches through 2n vertices out of 2n and
it could find adversarial examples among a tiny fraction of
these vertices. Recall, in the MNIST `∞ setup in Section 5,
it was enough to look up just ∼ 12 out of 2784 vertices
for each image achieving a 100% evasion over 1, 000 im-
ages. Note that after 2n queries, SignHunter may not
visit other vertices as they will be 2∞ away as shown in
Figure 3. We ignored this effect in our experiments.10 Will
SignHunter be more effective if the probes are made
strictly at the perturbation vertices? This question shows
up clearly in the public MNIST challenge where the loss
value at the potential adversarial examples dips after every
∼ 2n queries (see top left plot of Figure 13 in Appendix!F).
We conjecture the reason is that these potential adversarial
examples are not extreme points as illustrated in Figure 3:
they are like the red ball 2 rather than the red ball 1.
SignHunter for Black-Box Continuous Optimization.
In (Salimans et al., 2017; Chrabaszcz et al., 2018), it was
shown that a class of black-box continuous optimization
algorithms (NES as well as a very basic canonical ES al-
gorithm) rival the performance of standard reinforcement
learning techniques. On the other hand, SignHunter is
tailored towards recovering the gradient sign bits and cre-
ating adversarial examples similar to FGSM using the best
gradient sign estimation obtained so far. Can we incorporate
SignHunter in an iterative framework for continuous op-
timization? Figure 4 shows a small, preliminary experiment
comparing NES and ZO-SignSGD to a simple iterative
framework employing SignHunter. In the regime of high
dimension/few iterations, SignHunter can be remarkably
faster. However, with more iterations, the algorithm fails
to improve further and starts to oscillate. The reason is that
SignHunter always provides ±1 updates (non-standard
sign convention) compared to the other algorithms whose
updates can be zero. Can we get the best of both worlds?
8. Conclusion
Assuming a black-box threat model, we studied the prob-
lem of generating adversarial examples for neural nets and
proposed the gradient sign estimation problem as the core
9We define perturbation vertices as extreme points of the region
Bp(x, ). That is, x ± ∞, where ∞ =  when p = ∞ and
∞ = /
√
n when p = 2. See Figure 3.
10This effect is negligible for IMAGENET as 2n < 10, 000.
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Figure 3: Illustration of adversarial examples crafted by SignHunter in comparison to attacks that are based on the
continuous optimization in both (a) `∞ and (b) `2 settings. If SignHunter is given a query budget > 2n, which is the
case here, the crafted adversarial examples are not necessary at the perturbation vertices, e.g., the red ball 2. We can modify
SignHunter to strictly look up perturbation vertices. This could be done by doubling the step size from ∞ to 2∞ and
we leave this for future work as outlined in Section 7.
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Figure 4: SignHunter for continuous optimization. In this basic experiment, we run NES, ZO-SignSGD and
SignHunter to minimize a function f : Rn → R of the form ||x − x∗||22 for n ∈ {10, 100, 1000, 100000}. The
solid line represents the loss averaged over 30 independent trials with random x∗ ∼ U([0, 1]n) and the shaded region
indicates the standard deviation of results over random trials. We used a fixed step size of 0.01 in line with (Liu et al., 2019)
and a finite difference perturbation of 0.001. The starting point x(0) for all the algorithms was set to be the all-one vector 1n.
challenge in crafting these examples. We formulate the
problem as a binary black-box optimization one: minimiz-
ing the Hamming distance to the gradient sign or, equiv-
alently, maximizing the directional derivative. Approxi-
mated by the finite difference of the loss value queries, we
examine three properties of the directional derivative of
the model’s loss in the direction of {±1}n vectors. The
separability property helped us devise SignHunter, a
divide-and-conquer algorithm that is guaranteed to perform
at least as well as FGSM after O(n) queries. In practice,
SignHunter needs a fraction of this number of queries
to craft adversarial examples. To verify its effectiveness
on real-world datasets, SignHunter was evaluated on
neural network models for the MNIST, CIFAR10, and IM-
AGENET datasets. SignHunter yields black-box attacks
that are 2.5× more query efficient and 3.8× less failure-
prone than the state of the art attacks combined. Moreover,
SignHunter achieves the highest evasion rate on two pub-
lic black-box attack challenges. We also show that models
that are robust against substitute-model attacks are vulnera-
ble to our attack.
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Appendix A. Noisy FGSM
This section shows the performance of the noisy FGSM on standard models (described in Section 5 of the main paper) on the
MNIST, CIFAR10 and IMAGENET datasets. In Figure 5, we consider the `∞ threat perturbation constraint. Figure 6 reports
the performance for the 2 setup. Similar to (Ilyas et al., 2019), for each k in the experiment, the top k percent of the signs of
the coordinates—chosen either randomly (random-k) or by the corresponding magnitude |∂L(x, y)/∂xi| (top-k)—are
set correctly, and the rest are set to −1 or +1 at random. The misclassification rate shown considers only images that were
correctly classified (with no adversarial perturbation). In accordance with the models’ accuracy, there were 987, 962, and
792 such images for MNIST, CIFAR10, and IMAGENET out of the sampled 1000 images, respectively. These figures also
serve as a validation for Theorem 3 when compared to SignHunter’s performance shown in Appendix C.
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Figure 5: Misclassification rate of three neural nets (for (a) MNIST, (b) CIFAR10, and (c) IMAGENET, respectively) on the noisy
FGSM’s adversarial examples as a function of correctly estimated coordinates of sign(∇xf(x, y)) on random 1000 images from the
corresponding evaluation dataset, with the maximum allowed `∞ perturbation  being set to 0.3, 12, and 0.05, respectively. Across all the
models, estimating the sign of the top 30% gradient coordinates (in terms of their magnitudes) is enough to achieve a misclassification
rate of ∼ 70%. Note that Plot (c) is similar to (Ilyas et al., 2019)’s Figure 1, but it is produced with TensorFlow rather than PyTorch.
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Figure 6: Misclassification rate of three neural nets (for (a) MNIST, (b) CIFAR10, and (c) IMAGENET, respectively) on the noisy
FGSM’s adversarial examples as a function of correctly estimated coordinates of sign(∇xf(x, y)) on random 1000 images from the
corresponding evaluation dataset, with the maximum allowed `2 perturbation  being set to 3, 127, and 5, respectively. Compared
to Figure 5, the performance on MNIST and CIFAR10 drops significantly.
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Appendix B. A Framework for Estimating
Sign of the Gradient from Loss Oracles
Our interest in this section is to estimate the gradient sign
bits of the loss function L of the model under attack at an
input/label pair (x, y) from a limited number of loss value
queries L(x′, y). To this end, we examine the basic concept
of directional derivatives that has been employed in recent
black-box adversarial attacks. Particularly, we present three
approaches to estimate the gradient sign bits based on three
properties of the directional derivative DqL(x, y) of the
loss in the direction of a sign vector q ∈ H.
Approach 1: Divide & Conquer
Covered in the main article.
Approach 2: Loss Oracle as a Noisy Hamming Oracle
The directional derivative of the loss function L at (x, y) in
the direction of a binary code q can be written as
DqL(x, y) = q
Tg∗
=
∑
i∈I+q
|g∗i |−
∑
i∈I−q
|g∗i |
= |I+q |g¯I+q − |I−q |g¯I−q , (5)
where I+q ≡ {i | i ∈ [n] , q∗i = qi}, I−q ≡ [n] \ I+q . Note
that |I+q |+|I−q |= n. The quantities g¯I+q and g¯I−q are the
means of {|gi|}i∈I+q and {|gi|}i∈I−q , respectively. Observe
that |I−q |= ||q − q∗||H : the Hamming distance between q
and the gradient sign q∗. In other words, the directional
derivative DqL(x, y) has the following property.
Property 2. The directional derivative DqL(x, y) of the
loss function L at an input/label pair (x, y) in the direction
of a binary code q can be written as an affine transformation
of the Hamming distance between q and q∗. Formally, we
have
DqL(x, y) = ng¯I+q − (g¯I−q + g¯I+q )||q − q∗||H (6)
If we can recover the Hamming distance from the direc-
tional derivative based on Eq. 6, efficient Hamming search
strategies—e.g., (Maurer, 2009)—can then be used to re-
cover the gradient sign bits q∗ with a query complexity
Ω(n/log2(n + 1)) as stated in Theorem 1. However, not
all terms of Eq. 6 is known to us. While n is the number
of data features (known a priori) and DqL(x, y) is avail-
able through a finite difference oracle, g¯I+q and g¯I−q are not
known. Here, we propose to approximate these values by
their Monte Carlo estimates: averages of the magnitude of
sampled gradient components. Our assumption is that the
magnitudes of gradient coordinates are not very different
from each other, and hence a Monte Carlo estimate is good
enough (with small variance). Our experiments on MNIST,
CIFAR10, and IMAGENET confirm the same—see Fig-
ure 18 in Appendix G.
To use the ith gradient component g∗i as a sample for our
estimation, one can construct two binary codes u and v
such that only their ith bit is different, i.e., ||u− v||H= 1.
Thus, we have
|g∗i | =
|DuL(x, y)−DvL(x, y)|
2
(7)
q∗i = sign(g
∗
i ) =
{
ui if DuL(x, y) > DvL(x, y) ,
vi otherwise .
(8)
Let D be the set of indices of gradient components we
have recovered—magnitude and sign—so far through Eq. 7
and Eq. 8. Then,
g¯I+q ≈
1
|D+q |
∑
d∈D+q
|g∗d| , (9)
g¯I−q ≈
1
|D−q |
∑
d∈D−q
|g∗d| , (10)
where D+q ≡ {d | d ∈ D , q∗d = qi} and D−q ≡ D \
D+q .11 As a result, the Hamming distance between q and
the gradient sign q∗ can be approximated with the following
quantity, which we refer to as the noisy Hamming oracle Oˆ.
||q−q∗||H ≈
n
|D+q |
∑
d∈D+q |g∗d|−DqL(x, y)
1
|D+q |
∑
d∈D+q |g∗d|+ 1|D−q |
∑
d∈D−q |g∗d|
(11)
We empirically evaluated the quality of Oˆ’s responses
on a toy problem where we controlled the magnitude
spread/concentration of the gradient coordinates with m
being the number of unique values (magnitudes) of the gra-
dient coordinates. As detailed in Figure 7, the error can
reach dn/2e. This a big mismatch, especially if we recall
the Hamming distance’s range is [0, n]. The negative impact
of this on the Hamming search strategy by Maurer (2009)
was verified empirically in Figure 8. We considered the sim-
plest case where Maurer’s was given access to the noisy
Hamming oracle Oˆ in a setup similar to the one outlined
in Figure 7, with n = 80, |D|= n/4 = 20, m ∈ {1, 2},
and the hidden code q∗ = [+1, . . . ,+1]. To account for the
randomness in constructing D, we ran 30 independent runs
and plot the average Hamming distance (with confidence
bounds) over Maurer’s queries. In Figure 8 (a), m = 1
which corresponds to exact estimation Oˆ = O, Maurer’s
spends 21 queries to construct D and terminates one query
11It is possible that one of D+q and D−q will ∅ (e.g., when we
only have one sample). In this case, we make the approximation
as g¯I+q = g¯I−q ≈
1
|D|
∑
d∈D|g∗d | .
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Figure 7: The error distribution of the noisy Hamming oracle Oˆ (right side of Eq. 11) compared to the noiseless counterpart
O (left side of Eq. 11) as a function of the number of unique values (magnitudes) of the gradient coordinates m. Here,
L(x, y) has the form cTx. That is, m = |uniq(|c|)|≤ n with n ∈ {5, 10} being the input length. With m = 1, the
estimation is exact (Oˆ = O) for all the binary code queries q—32 codes for n = 5, 1028 codes for n = 10. The error seems
to be bounded by dn2 e. For a given m, ci—the ith coordinate of c—is randomly assigned a value from the m evenly spaced
numbers in the range [0.1,m/n]. We set the size of the sampled gradient coordinates set |D| to bn/4c.
afterwards with the true binary code q∗, achieving a query
ratio of 21/80. On the other hand, when we set m = 2
in Figure 8 (b); Maurer’s returns a 4-Hamming-distance
away solution from the true binary code q∗ after 51 queries.
This is not bad for an 80-bit long code. However, this is
in a tightly controlled setup where the gradient magnitudes
are just one of two values. To be studied further is the
bias/variance decomposition of the returned solution and
the corresponding query ratio. We leave this investigation
for future work.
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Figure 8: Performance of Maurer’s on the noisy Ham-
ming oracle Oˆ. The setup is similar to that of Figure 7, with
n = 80 and m ∈ {1, 2}.
Approach 3: Optimism in the Face of Uncertainty
In the previous approach, we considered the approximated
Hamming distance (Eq. 11) as a surrogate for the formal
optimization objective (Eq. 3 in the main paper) of the
gradient sign estimation problem. We found that current
Hamming search strategies are not robust to approxima-
tion error. In this approach, we consider maximizing the
directional derivative (Eq. 4 in the main paper)
max
q∈H
DqL(x, y) , (12)
as our formal objective of the gradient sign estimation prob-
lem. Formally, we treat the problem as a binary black-box
optimization over the 2n hypercube vertices, which cor-
respond to all possible sign vectors. This is significantly
worse than O(n) of the continuous optimization view. Nev-
ertheless, the rationale here is that we do not need to solve
Eq. 12 to optimality (recall the effectiveness of noisy FGSM
in Appendix A); we rather need a fast convergence to a sub-
optimal but adversarially helpful sign vector q. In addition,
the continuous optimization view often employs an iterative
scheme of T steps within the perturbation ball Bp(x, ),
calling the gradient estimation routine in every step leading
to a search complexity of nT . In our setup, we use the best
obtained solution for Eq. 12 so far in a similar fashion to the
noisy FGSM. In other words, our gradient sign estimation
routine runs at the top level of our adversarial example gen-
eration procedure instead of calling it as a subroutine. In this
and the next approach, we address the following question:
how do we solve Eq. 12?
Optimistic methods, i.e., methods that implement the opti-
mism in the face of uncertainty principle have demonstrated
a theoretical as well as empirical success when applied to
black-box optimization problems (Munos, 2011; Al-Dujaili
& Suresh, 2017; 2018). Such a principle finds its founda-
tions in the machine learning field addressing the explo-
ration vs. exploitation dilemma, known as the multi-armed
bandit problem. Within the context of function optimization,
optimistic approaches formulate the complex problem of
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optimizing an arbitrary black-box function g (e.g., Eq. 12)
over the search space (H in this paper) as a hierarchy of
simple bandit problems (Kocsis & Szepesvári, 2006) in the
form of space-partitioning tree search T . At step t, the al-
gorithm optimistically expands a leaf node (partitions the
corresponding subspace) from the set of leaf nodes Lt that
may contain the global optimum. The ith node at depth
h, denoted by (h, i), corresponds to the subspace/cellHh,i
such thatH = ∪0≤i<KhHh,i. To each node (h, i), a repre-
sentative point qh,i ∈ Hh,i is assigned, and the value of the
node (h, i) is set to g(qh,i). See Figure 11 for an example
of a space-partitioning tree T of H, which will be used in
our second approach to estimate the gradient sign vector.
Under some assumptions on the optimization objective and
the hierarchical partitioning T of the search space, opti-
mistic methods enjoy a finite-time bound on their regret Rt
defined as
Rt = g(q
∗)− g(q(t)) , (13)
where q(t) is the best found solution by the optimistic
method after t steps. The challenge is how to align the
search space such that these assumptions hold. In the fol-
lowing, we show that these assumptions can be satisfied
for our optimization objective (Eq. 12). In particular, when
g(q) is the directional derivative function DqL(x, y), and
H’s vertices are aligned on a 1-dimensional line according
to the Gray code ordering, then we can construct an opti-
mistic algorithm with a finite-time bound on its regret. To
demonstrate this, we adopt the Simultaneous Optimistic Op-
timization framework by Munos (2011) and the assumptions
therein.
For completeness, we reproduce (Munos, 2011)’s basic defi-
nitions and assumptions with respect to our notation. At the
same time we show how the gradient sign estimation prob-
lem (Eq. 12) satisfies them based on the second property of
the directional derivative as follows.
Definition 2 (Semi-metric). We assume that κ : H×H →
R+ is such that for all p, q ∈ H, we have κ(p, q) = κ(q,p)
and κ(p, q) = 0 if and only if p = q.
Definition 3 (Near-optimality dimension). The near-
optimal dimension is the smallest d ≥ 0 such that there
exists C > 0 such that for any ε > 0, the maximal number
of disjoint κ-balls of radius υε and center inHε is less than
Cε−d.
Property 3 (Local smoothness of DqL(x, y)). For any
input/label pair (x, y), there exists at least a global op-
timizer q∗ ∈ H of DqL(x, y) (i.e., Dq∗L(x, y) =
supq∈HDqL(x, y)) and for all q ∈ H,
Dq∗L(x, y)−DqL(x, y) ≤ κ(q, q∗) .
Refer to Figure 9 for a pictorial proof of Property 3.
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Figure 9: The directional derivative Dqf(x) of some function
f at a point x in the direction of a binary vector q ∈ H ≡
{−1,+1}n is locally smooth around the gradient sign vector,
q∗ = sign(∇xf(x)) ∈ H, when H is ordered over one co-
ordinate as a sequence of Gray codes. The plots show the local
smoothness property—with two semi-metrics κ1(·, ·) and κ2(·, ·)—
of the directional derivative of functions f of the form cTx and
xTQx for n ∈ {3, 4}, as tabulated in Plots (a), (c) and (b, d),
respectively. The local smoothness is evident as Dq∗f(x) −
Dqf(x) ≤ κ1(q, q∗) and Dq∗f(x)−Dqf(x) ≤ κ2(q, q∗) for
all q ∈ H. The semi-metrics κ1(q, q∗) and κ2(q, q∗) have the
form K|rankGray(q)− rankGray(q∗)|α, where rankGray(·)
refers to the rank of an n-binary code in the Gray ordering of n-
binary codes (e.g., rankGray([−1,−1,+1,−1]) = 4), K > 0 ,
and α > 0. With this property at hand, we employ the optimism
in the face of uncertainty principle in GOO to maximize Dqf(x)
overH. For legibility, we replaced −1 with 0 when enumerating
H on the x-axis.
Assumption 1 (Bounded diameters). There exists a decreas-
ing a decreasing sequence ω(h) > 0, such that for any
depth 0 ≤ h < n, for any cell Hh,i of depth h, we have
supq∈Hh,i κ(qh,i, q) ≤ ω(h).
To see how Assumption 1 is met, refer to Figure 11.
Assumption 2 (Well-shaped cells). There exists υ > 0 such
that for any depth 0 ≤ h < n, any cell Hh,i contains a κ-
ball of radius υω(h) centered in qh,i.
To see how Assumption 2 is met, refer to Figure 11. With
the above assumptions satisfied, we propose the Gray-code
Optimistic Optimization (GOO), which is an instantiation of
(Munos, 2011, Algorithm 2) tailored to our optimization
problem (Eq. 12) over a 1-dimensional alignment of H
using the Gray code ordering. The pseudocode is outlined in
Algorithm 3. The following theorem bounds GOO’s regret.
Theorem 4. Regret Convergence of GOO Let us write h(t)
the smallest integer h such that
Chmax(t)
h∑
l=0
ω(l)−d + 1 ≥ t . (14)
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Algorithm 3 Gray-code Optimistic Optimization (GOO)
Input:
g : H → R : the black-box linear function to be max-
imized over the binary hypercube H ≡
{−1,+1}n
hmax(t) : the maximum depth function which limits
the tree to grow up to hmax(t)+1 after t node
expansions
Initialization: Set t = 1, Tt = {(0, 0)} (root node). AlignH over Tt using the Gray
code ordering.
while True do
vmax ← −∞
for h = 0 to min(depth(Tt), hmax(t)) do
Among all leaves (h, j) ∈ Lt of depth h, select
(h, i) ∈ argmax
(h,j)∈Lt
g(qh,i)
if g(qh,i) ≥ vmax then
Expand this node: add to Tt the two children (h + 1, ik)1≤k≤2
vmax ← g(qh,i)
t← t + 1
if query budget is exhaused then
return the best found solution q(t).
end if
end if
end for
end while
Then, with g(q) = DqL(x, y), the regret of GOO (Algo-
rithm 3) is bounded as
Rt ≤ ω(min(h(t), hmax(t) + 1))
Proof. We have showed that our objective function (Eq. 12)
and the hierarchical partitioning of H following the Gray
code ordering confirm to Property 3 and Assumptions 1
and 2. The +1 term in Eq. 14 is to accommodate the evalu-
ation of node (n, 0) before growing the space-partitioning
tree T—see Figure 11. The rest follows from the proof of
(Munos, 2011, Theorem 2).
Despite being theoretically-founded, GOO is slow in practice.
This is expected since it is a global search technique that
considers all the 2n vertices of the n-dimensional hypercube
H. Recall that we are looking for adversarially helpful
solution q that may not be necessarily optimal.
Empirical Evaluation of the Approaches on a Set of
Toy Problems
We tested both GOO and SignHunter (along with
Maurer’s and Elimination)12 on a set of toy prob-
lems and found that SignHunter performs significantly
better than GOO, while Maurer’s and Elimination
were sensitive to the approximation error—see Figure 10.
We remind the reader that Maurer’s and Elimination
are two search strategies for q∗ using the Hamming oracle.
After response r(i) to query q(i), Elimination elimi-
nates all binary codes q ∈ H with ||q − q(i)||H 6= r(i) in
12See Appendix C for details on these algorithms.
an iterative manner. Note that Elimination is a naive
technique that is not scalable with n. For Maurer’s, we
refer the reader to (Maurer, 2009).
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Figure 10: Noiseless vs. Noisy Hamming Oracle: The trace of the Hamming distance (first column, where the lower the trace the better)
and directional derivative (second column, where the higher the trace the better) values of Elimination and Maurer’s queries, when
given access to a noiseless/ideal (first row) and noisy Hamming oracles (second row)—through a directional derivative approximation
as discussed in Approach 2—for a synthetic function f of the form xTQx with n = 7. We expect the traces to go up and down as
they explore the 2n search space. The end of an algorithm’s trace represents the value of the Hamming distance (directional derivative)
for the first column (for the second column) at the algorithm’s solution. For comparison, we also plot GOO and SignHunter’s traces.
Note that the performance of GOO and SignHunter is the same in both noiseless and noisy cases as both algorithms operate directly
on the directional derivative approximation rather than the noiseless/noisy Hamming oracle. In the case of noiseless Hamming oracle,
both Elimination and Maurer’s finds the optimal vector q∗ ∈ H ≡ {−1,+1}7 with # queries ≤ 7—their traces end at most at 8
just to show that the algorithm’s solution achieves a zero Hamming distance as shown in Plot (a), which corresponds to the maximum
directional derivative in Plot (b). With a noisy Hamming oracle, these algorithm break as shown in Plots (c) and (d): taking more than
n queries and returning sub-optimal solutions—e.g., Maurer’s returns on average a three-Hamming-distance solution. On the other
hand, GOO and SignHunter achieve a zero Hamming distance in both cases at the expense of being less query efficient. While being
theoretically-founded, GOO is slow as it employs a global search over the 2n space. Despite SignHunter’s local search, it converges
to the optimal solution after 2× 7 queries in accordance with Theorem 3. The solid curves indicate the corresponding averaged trace
surrounded by a 95%-confidence bounds using 30 independent runs. For convenience, we plot the symmetric bounds where in fact they
should be asymmetric in Plots (a) and (c) as the Hamming distance’s range is Z+0 .
(a) (h, i) view (b) qh,i view
Figure 11: Illustration of the proposed Gray-ordering based partitioning (fully expanded) tree T of the search spaceH = {−1,+1}n—
with n = 5—used in the Gray-code Optimistic Optimization (GOO). The plots are two different views of the same tree. Plot (a) displays the
node name (h, i), while Plot (b) shows its representative binary code qh,i ∈ H. For brevity, we replaced −1s with 0s. The red oval and
rectangle highlights the tree’s root and its corresponding binary code, respectively. Consider the node (2, 1) whose representative code
is q2,1 = [−1,+1,−1,+1,−1] and its corresponding subspace H2,1 = {q2,1, q3,2, q3,3, q4,4, q4,5, q4,6, q4,7}. The same reasoning
applies to the rest of the nodes. To maintain a valid binary partition tree, one can ignore the anomaly leaf node (5, 0), this corresponds
to the code q5,0 = [−1,−1,−1,−1,−1], which in practice can be evaluated prior to building the tree. Let us consider the nodes at
depth h = 2, observe that for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} 1) |H2,i|= 7 ; 2) q2,i is centered around the other 6 members ofH2,i in the Gray code
ordering; and that 3) H2,i constitutes a contiguous block of codes along the 1-dimensional alignment shown below the tree. Thus, it
suffices to define a semi-metric based on the corresponding indices of the codes along this alignment. For a given depth h, the index of
any code q ∈ Hh,i is at most ω(h) = supj |Hh+1,j |, which establishes Assumption 2. Assumption 3 follows naturally from the fact that
nodes at a given depth h partition the search spaceH equally (e.g., |H2,i|= 7 for all i).
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Appendix C. Proofs for Theorems in the Main Paper
Along with the proofs, we restate the theorems for completeness.
Theorem 2. A hidden n-dimensional binary code q∗ ∈ H can be retrieved exactly with no more than n queries to the
noiseless Hamming oracle O.
Proof. The key element of this proof is that the Hamming distance between two n-dimensional binary codes q, q∗ ∈ H can
be written as
r = ||q − q∗||H= 1
2
(n− qTq∗) . (15)
Let Q be an n× n matrix where the ith row is the ith query code q(i). Likewise, let r(i) be the corresponding ith query
response, and r is the concatenating vector. In matrix form, we have
q∗ = Q−1(n1n − 2r) ,
where Q is invertible if we construct linearly independent queries {q(i)}1≤i≤n.
In Figure 12, we plot the bounds above for n = {1, . . . , 10}, along with two search strategies for q∗ using the Hamming
oracle: i) Maurer’s (Maurer, 2009); and ii) search by Elimination which, after response r(i) to query q(i), eliminates
all binary codes q ∈ H with ||q − q(i)||H 6= r(i) in an iterative manner. Note that Elimination is a naive technique that
is not scalable with n.
Theorem 3. (Optimality of SignHunter) Given 2dlog(n)+1e queries and that the directional derivative is well approxi-
mated by the finite-difference (Eq. 2 in the main paper), SignHunter is at least as effective as FGSM (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) in crafting adversarial examples.
Proof. Recall that the ith coordinate of the gradient sign vector can be recovered as outlined in Eq. 8. From the definition
of SignHunter, this is carried out for all the n coordinates after 2dlog(n)+1e queries. Put it differently, after 2dlog(n)+1e
queries, SignHunter has flipped every coordinate alone recovering its sign exactly as shown in Eq. 8. Therefore, the
gradient sign vector is fully recovered, and one can employ the FGSM attack to craft an adversarial example. Note that this
is under the assumption that our finite difference approximation of the directional derivative (Eq. 2 in the main paper) is
good enough (or at least a rank-preserving).
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Figure 12: Expected Query Ratios for n = {1, . . . , 10} with the noiseless Hamming oracle O.
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Appendix D. Experiments Setup
This section outlines the experiments setup as follows. Fig-
ure 13 shows the performance of the considered algorithms
on a synthetic concave loss function after tuning their hy-
perparameters. A possible explanation of SignHunter’s
superb performance is that the synthetic loss function is
well-behaved in terms of its gradient given an image. That
is, most of gradient coordinates share the same sign, since
pixels tend to have the same values and the optimal value for
all the pixels is the same xmin+xmax2 . Thus, SignHunter
will recover the true gradient sign with as few queries as pos-
sible (recall the example in Section 4.1 of the main paper).
Moreover, given the structure of the synthetic loss function,
the optimal loss value is always at the boundary of the per-
turbation region. The boundary is where SignHunter
samples its perturbations. Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 outline the
algorithms’ hyperparameters, while Table 4 describes the
general setup for the experiments.
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Figure 13: Tuning testbed for the attacks. A synthetic loss
function was used to tune the performance of the attacks
over a random sample of 25 images for each dataset and
`p perturbation constraint. The plots above show the av-
erage performance of the tuned attacks on the synthetic
loss function L(x, y) = −(x − x∗)T (x − x∗), where
x∗ = xmin+xmax2 using a query limit of 1000 queries for
each image. Note that in all, BanditsTD outperforms
both NES and ZO-SignSGD. Also, we observe the same
behavior reported by (Liu et al., 2019) on the fast conver-
gence of ZO-SignSGD compared to NES. We did not tune
SignHunter; it does not have any tunable parameters.
Table 4: General setup for all the attacks
Value
MNIST CIFAR10 IMAGENET
`∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2
Parameter
 (allowed perturbation) 0.3 3 12 127 0.05 5
Max allowed queries 10000
Evaluation/Test set size 1000
Data (pixel value) Range [0,1] [0,255] [0,1]
Table 5: Hyperparameters setup for NES
Value
MNIST CIFAR10 IMAGENET
`∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2
Hyperparameter
δ (finite difference probe) 0.1 0.1 2.55 2.55 0.1 0.1
η (image `p learning rate) 0.1 1 2 127 0.02 2
q (number of finite difference estimations per step) 10 20 20 4 100 50
Table 6: Hyperparameters setup for ZO-SignSGD
Value
MNIST CIFAR10 IMAGENET
`∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2
Hyperparameter
δ (finite difference probe) 0.1 0.1 2.55 2.55 0.1 0.1
η (image `p learning rate) 0.1 0.1 2 2 0.02 0.004
q (number of finite difference estimations per step) 10 20 20 4 100 50
Table 7: Hyperparameters setup for BanditsTD
Value
MNIST CIFAR10 IMAGENET
`∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2
Hyperparameter
η (image `p learning rate) 0.03 0.01 5 12 0.01 0.1
δ (finite difference probe) 0.1 0.1 2.55 2.55 0.1 0.1
τ (online convex optimization learning rate) 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 1e-05 0.0001 0.1
Tile size (data-dependent prior) 8 10 20 20 50 50
ζ (bandit exploration) 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.1
Table 8: Hyperparameters setup for SignHunter
Value
MNIST CIFAR10 IMAGENET
`∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2
Hyperparameter
δ (finite difference probe) 0.3 3 12 127 0.05 5
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Appendix E. Results of Adversarial Black-Box Examples Generation
This section shows results of our experiments in crafting adversarial black-box examples in the form of tables and
performance traces, namely Figures 14, 15, and 16; and Tables 9, 10, and 11.
Table 9: Summary of attacks effectiveness on MNIST under `∞ and `2 perturbation constraints, and with a query limit of
10, 000 queries. The Failure Rate ∈ [0, 1] column lists the fraction of failed attacks over 1000 images. The Avg. # Queries
column reports the average number of queries made to the loss oracle only over successful attacks.
Failure Rate Avg. # Queries
`∞ `2 `∞ `2
Attack
BanditsTD 0.68 0.59 328.00 673.16
NES 0.63 0.63 235.07 361.42
SignHunter 0.00 0.04 11.06 1064.22
ZOSignSGD 0.63 0.75 157.00 881.08
Table 10: Summary of attacks effectiveness on CIFAR10 under `∞ and `2 perturbation constraints, and with a query limit of
10, 000 queries. The Failure Rate ∈ [0, 1] column lists the fraction of failed attacks over 1000 images. The Avg. # Queries
column reports the average number of queries made to the loss oracle only over successful attacks.
Failure Rate Avg. # Queries
`∞ `2 `∞ `2
Attack
BanditsTD 0.95 0.39 432.24 1201.85
NES 0.37 0.67 312.57 496.99
SignHunter 0.07 0.21 121.00 692.39
ZOSignSGD 0.37 0.80 161.28 528.35
Table 11: Summary of attacks effectiveness on IMAGENET under `∞ and `2 perturbation constraints, and with a query
limit of 10, 000 queries. The Failure Rate ∈ [0, 1] column lists the fraction of failed attacks over 1000 images. The Avg. #
Queries column reports the average number of queries made to the loss oracle only over successful attacks.
Failure Rate Avg. # Queries
`∞ `2 `∞ `2
Attack
BanditsTD 0.07 0.11 1010.05 1635.55
NES 0.26 0.42 1536.19 1393.86
SignHunter 0.02 0.23 578.56 1985.55
ZOSignSGD 0.23 0.52 1054.98 931.15
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Figure 14: Performance curves of attacks on MNIST for `∞ (first column) and `2 (second column) perturbation constraints.
Plots of Avg. Loss row reports the loss as a function of the number of queries averaged over all images. The Avg. Hamming
Similarity row shows the Hamming similarity of the sign of the attack’s estimated gradient gˆ with true gradient’s sign q∗,
computed as 1− ||sign(gˆ)− q∗||H/n and averaged over all images. Likewise, plots of the Avg. Cosine Similarity row show
the normalized dot product of gˆ and g∗ averaged over all images. The Success Rate row reports the attacks’ cumulative
distribution functions for the number of queries required to carry out a successful attack up to the query limit of 10, 000
queries. The Avg. # Queries row reports the average number of queries used per successful image for each attack when
reaching a specified success rate: the more effective the attack, the closer its curve is to the bottom right of the plot.
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Figure 15: Performance curves of attacks on CIFAR10 for `∞ (first column) and `2 (second column) perturbation constraints.
Plots of Avg. Loss row reports the loss as a function of the number of queries averaged over all images. The Avg. Hamming
Similarity row shows the Hamming similarity of the sign of the attack’s estimated gradient gˆ with true gradient’s sign q∗,
computed as 1− ||sign(gˆ)− q∗||H/n and averaged over all images. Likewise, plots of the Avg. Cosine Similarity row show
the normalized dot product of gˆ and g∗ averaged over all images. The Success Rate row reports the attacks’ cumulative
distribution functions for the number of queries required to carry out a successful attack up to the query limit of 10, 000
queries. The Avg. # Queries row reports the average number of queries used per successful image for each attack when
reaching a specified success rate: the more effective the attack, the closer its curve is to the bottom right of the plot.
There are No Bit Parts for Sign Bits in Black-Box Attacks
`∞ `2
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# queries
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
av
er
ag
e
lo
ss
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# queries
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
av
er
ag
e
lo
ss
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# queries
0.500
0.501
0.502
0.503
0.504
0.505
av
er
ag
e
H
am
m
in
g
si
m
ila
ri
ty
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# queries
0.500
0.502
0.504
0.506
0.508
0.510
av
er
ag
e
H
am
m
in
g
si
m
ila
ri
ty
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# queries
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
av
er
ag
e
co
si
ne
si
m
ila
ri
ty
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# queries
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
av
er
ag
e
co
si
ne
si
m
ila
ri
ty
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# queries
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
su
cc
es
s
ra
te
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# queries
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
su
cc
es
s
ra
te
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
success rate
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
av
er
ag
e
#
qu
er
ie
s
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
success rate
0
500
1000
1500
2000
av
er
ag
e
#
qu
er
ie
s
BanditsTD
NES
SignHunter
ZOSignSGD
Figure 16: Performance curves of attacks on IMAGENET for `∞ (first column) and `2 (second column) perturbation
constraints. Plots of Avg. Loss row reports the loss as a function of the number of queries averaged over all images. The Avg.
Hamming Similarity row shows the Hamming similarity of the sign of the attack’s estimated gradient gˆ with true gradient’s
sign q∗, computed as 1− ||sign(gˆ)− q∗||H/n and averaged over all images. Likewise, plots of the Avg. Cosine Similarity
row show the normalized dot product of gˆ and g∗ averaged over all images. The Success Rate row reports the attacks’
cumulative distribution functions for the number of queries required to carry out a successful attack up to the query limit of
10, 000 queries. The Avg. # Queries row reports the average number of queries used per successful image for each attack
when reaching a specified success rate: the more effective the attack, the closer its curve is to the bottom right of the plot.
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Appendix F. Public Black-Box Challenge Results
Madry’s Lab (MNIST) Madry’s Lab (CIFAR10) Ensemble Adversarial Training (IMAGENET)
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Figure 17: Performance curves of attacks on the public black-box challenges for MNIST (first column), CIFAR10 (second
column) and IMAGENET (third column). Plots of Avg. Loss row reports the loss as a function of the number of queries
averaged over all images. The Avg. Hamming Similarity row shows the Hamming similarity of the sign of the attack’s
estimated gradient gˆ with true gradient’s sign q∗, computed as 1 − ||sign(gˆ) − q∗||H/n and averaged over all images.
Likewise, plots of the Avg. Cosine Similarity row show the normalized dot product of gˆ and g∗ averaged over all images.
The Success Rate row reports the attacks’ cumulative distribution functions for the number of queries required to carry out a
successful attack up to the query limit of 5, 000 queries. The Avg. # Queries row reports the average number of queries used
per successful image for each attack when reaching a specified success rate: the more effective the attack, the closer its
curve is to the bottom right of the plot.
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Appendix G. Estimating Hamming Oracle
This section illustrates our experiment on the distribution of the magnitudes of gradient coordinates as summarized in
Figure 18. How to read the plots: Consider the first histogram in Plot (a) from below; it corresponds to the 1000th image
from the sampled MNIST evaluation set, plotting the histogram of the values {|∂L(x, y)/∂xi|}1≤i≤n, where the MNIST
dataset has dimensionality n = 784. These values are in the range [0, 0.002]. Overall, the values are fairly concentrated—
with exceptions, in Plot (e) for instance, the magnitudes of the ∼ 400th image’s gradient coordinates are spread from 0 to
∼ 0.055. Thus, a Monte Carlo estimate of the mean of {|∂L(x, y)/∂xi|}1≤i≤n would be an appropriate approximation.
We release these figures in the form of TensorBoard logs.
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Figure 18: Magnitudes of gradient coordinates are concentrated: Plots (a), (b), and (c) show histograms of the magnitudes
of gradient coordinates of the loss function L(x, y) with respect to the input point (image) x for MNIST, CIFAR10, and
IMAGENET neural net models over 1000 images from the corresponding evaluation set, respectively. Plots (d), (e), (f)
show the same but at input points (images) sampled randomly within B∞(x, ): the `∞-ball of radius  = 0.3, 12, and 0.05
around the images in Plots (a), (b), and (c), respectively.
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